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Abstract 
This study compared conversations among groups of teachers of high school geometry that had 
been triggered by either a video or an animation representation of instruction and managed with 
an open-ended agenda. All triggers represented scenarios that departed from what was 
hypothesized as normative. We used as the dependent variable the proportion of modal 
statements about instructional practice made by a group, which we argue is a good quantitative 
indicator that the statement appeals to the group’s knowledge of the norms of practice. 
Animations and videos produced similar proportion of modal statements, but the types of modal 
statements differed—with animations being associated with more statements of probability and 
obligation and videos being associated with more statements of inclination.  
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 Introduction 
 This paper is concerned with a methodological question in research on teaching: How can 
we access teaching knowledge that can be tacit in nature? Our purpose here is to contribute to 
validate the technique of utilizing open-ended agendas for group discussions of cartoon-based 
classroom scenarios, by benchmarking those against the more common use of videotaped 
episodes. We utilize a linguistic measure of the discussions elicited to do such benchmarking. 
We start the paper, however, by situating our study in a discussion of teaching knowledge and on 
the reasons that have motivated us to use both videos and animations in focus group sessions 
with experienced practitioners.  
The Nature of Teaching Knowledge 
Teacher knowledge has been identified as a crucial factor in students’ opportunity to 
learn (Shulman, 1986). Professionalization of teaching relies on the possibility to articulate and 
organize this knowledge (Shulman 1987). As Buchmann (1987) noted, however, the expression 
“teacher knowledge” may require too early a commitment to the question of how widely spread 
this knowledge is among individuals, while a more fundamental question to ask first is what that 
knowledge consists of. Consequently, Buchmann proposed the alternative expression “teaching 
knowledge.” Among the components of teaching knowledge, Buchmann (1987) identified the 
folkways of teaching:  
The folkways of teaching describe 'teaching as usual', learned and practised in the 
half-conscious way in which people go about their everyday life, where they carry 
themselves fittingly. These folkways are typical and generally work; they have 
their correlates in the character of school knowledge, that is, in the content and 
structure of what children learn in school. (Buchmann, 1987, p. 153) 
 Buchmann’s choice to talk about “teaching knowledge” was deliberate so as to leave the 
question open as to whether and how this knowledge is held by individuals. Her classification of 
teaching knowledge (into folkways of teaching, local mores, private views, and teaching 
expertise) illustrated how some elements of knowledge might be more individual than others 
(e.g., private views contrasted in this sense with local mores that referred to maxims or missions 
that might be common among people working in locales such as schools or communities). 
Elements in that classification also contrasted in regard to the sources of their validity. Teaching 
expertise, in particular, contrasted with the folkways of teaching in regard to the existence of 
explicit sources of justification:   
Teaching expertise goes beyond their mastery or skilled performance by including 
(1) judgments of appropriateness, testing of consequences, and consideration of 
ends, not just means; and (2) less typical modes of practice, such as explanation, 
discussion and the deliberate management of value dilemmas by the teacher. 
(Buchmann, 1987, p. 154). 
 
Thus for Buchmann, teaching knowledge contains elements held collectively and individually, as 
well as elements held tacitly (in the form of ways of doing things that belong in the folkways of 
teaching) and elements held explicitly (tied to justificatory discourses, as in teaching expertise). 
Cook and Brown (1999) offer a compatible framework to describe organizational knowledge. 
For them, the knowledge of organizations can be individually held or collectively held, and it can 
also be explicit or tacit.  
Herbst and Chazan (2003, 2011, in press) have used the expression practical rationality 
to refer to the source of justifications of actions in teaching. Like Buchmann (1986), Herbst and 
Chazan are interested not on a teacher’s personal explanation of their actions, but in the public 
justification that could be offered of their actions. The sources of those justifications cover the 
continuum between Buchmann’s folkways of teaching and teaching expertise, inasmuch as these 
justifications can be ascribed to a practice rather than to individual practitioners. The expression 
practical rationality, adapted from Bourdieu’s (1998) theory of practice, underscores the 
possibility that even though the actions of ‘teaching as usual’ may be tacit or half-conscious, they 
may have a reason to exist, particularly inasmuch as they are adapted to negotiate the conditions 
and constraints of the practice in which they participate. Furthermore, some elements of this 
rationality can be quite explicit and available for teachers to come up with alternative ways of 
acting or to justify departures from ordinary ways of acting.  
In our earlier work (e.g., Herbst, 2003, 2006), we’ve described action in teaching as 
regulated by norms that may be more or less tacit. These norms could apply to mathematics 
instruction as a whole (e.g., the norm that if a teacher assigns a problem, the teacher is expected 
to know the answer to the problem), or they can apply to specific knowledge transactions (e.g., 
the norm that when expecting students to do a proof, the teacher is expected to provide the 
conclusion that students will prove). Our account of practical rationality has described it as 
generated on the basis of those norms as well as on relatively explicit professional obligations: 
Obligations to the discipline a teacher teaches, to the individual students to be taught, to the 
group of students with whom instruction proceeds, and to the school institution in which that 
instructional system is located (Herbst & Chazan, 2011). Those basic elements span or generate 
more or less tacit dispositions that could be described as instantiations or combinations of those 
obligations that sometimes enable practitioners to justify deviations from those norms.  
Our empirical research has sought to ground the constructs norm and disposition in 
conversations about instruction among groups of teachers. To facilitate those conversations we 
initially used clips of video recorded instruction (e.g., Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Nachlieli and 
Herbst, 2009; Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2009). Later, we produced animated scenarios using 
cartoon characters (Chazan, Sela, and Herbst, 2012; Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008; Herbst, 
Nachlieli, and Chazan, 2011). In both cases, the viewing of the representations was managed 
with a rather open ended agenda, where moderators sought to devolve control to practitioners 
about the subject of their conversation and researchers who were present only asked provoking 
questions about the issues that practitioners sought to speak about (Nachlieli, 2011). In other 
writing we have discussed how specific conversations have shed light on various substantive 
elements of practical rationality, such as how teachers of geometry perceive and appreciate 
deviations to norms in the installation of theorems in geometry (Herbst et al., 2011), the doing of 
proofs in geometry (Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Weiss, et al., 2009), the solving of equations in 
algebra (Chazan & Lueke, 2009; Chazan & Herbst, 2011) and the doing of word problems in 
algebra (Chazan, Herbst, and Sela, 2011; Chazan, et al., 2012). In contrast with those 
examinations of specific norms, the present paper looks above the particulars of specific 
instructional situations and their norms and uses data generated in response to both animations 
and video representations. The aim of this paper is to compare the conversations that teachers 
had in response to the two kinds of representations that could equally be used to elicit group 
knowledge of practice (or practical rationality). We believe that such a comparison would aid us 
in determining whether the type of representation of teaching used (video or animation) interacts 
with the form of appraisal teachers made to a group of peers regarding instruction. We focus on 
tacit knowledge of mathematics teaching held by the group of practitioners responsible for 
congruent curricular goals (canonically, teachers teaching the same course of studies): This 
knowledge could be described as knowledge of the norms of practice associated to teaching such 
course. This paper aims at validating the use of animations of cartoon characters as a technique 
for the elicitation of tacit group knowledge.  
Norms and Dispositions: Tacit Knowledge of the Teaching Profession 
 As an organization, teaching relies on various kinds of knowledge. Cook and Brown 
(1999) distinguish between kinds of knowledge along two dimensions: How the knowledge is 
held (explicit or tacit knowledge), and where the knowledge is held (individual or group 
knowledge). Explicit knowledge can be represented through sentences and formulae and can 
describe a large part, but arguably not all, of the subject matter that teachers teach. Explicit 
knowledge can also encompass the basic obligations of the teaching profession (e.g., to their 
discipline, to students as individuals, to the class as a social group, to the school institution), 
often represented through maxims such as ‘all students can learn.’ Tacit knowledge, however, 
either is not or cannot be conveyed through such mediums and is “tied to the senses, movement 
skills, physical experience, intuition, or rules of thumb” (Erden, von Krogh, & Nonaka, 2008, p. 
5) in a given context. Both of these forms of knowledge can be held by individuals or shared in 
groups. We focus on tacit knowledge that is also group knowledge as a larger container where to 
situate teaching knowledge of the norms of instruction and the dispositions that justify or indict 
deviations from those norms. This section reviews some of this literature.  
 Erden et al. (2008) suggest that when individuals in a group are confronted with a 
problematic task, they begin to act collectively in solving the task without explicit procedures, 
rules, or communication. The knowledge that is shared amongst these individuals is tacit group 
knowledge. Yet, to possess the tacit knowledge specific to a group, individuals must be 
completely socialized into that group (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998). Various authors (e.g., Collins, 
2010; Erden et al., 2008; Leonard & Sensiper, 1998) characterize tacit group knowledge as being 
developed through interaction between members of a group, but simultaneously being tied into 
the actions of the group. Without a shared set of experiences, tacit group knowledge does not 
exist (Erden et al., 2008).  
Exemplifying tacit group knowledge, Collins (2010) describes the coordination needed 
among bicycle riders and car drivers to negotiate sharing the road. While the bicycle rider 
possesses a degree of individual (somatic, embodied) tacit knowledge of how to balance their 
self on the bike, they partake of a collective tacit knowledge about riding a bicycle in traffic. 
Traffic patterns include explicit elements of knowledge such as the conventions of using hand 
signals yet they also include tacit and important elements represented in the coordination of 
movements and facial expressions between riders and automobile drivers. Collins notes that this 
tacit knowledge can and will vary by geographic region. In such a sense, we can characterize 
some tacit group knowledge as existing in the form of norms or sets of mutual expectations that 
members of a practice hold for themselves and other participants; these are not explicit like rules 
or laws, but participants can be described as acting as if they were applying such a rule. In 
Collins’s (2010) traffic example, the collective includes drivers and riders using vehicles 
(bicycles and automobiles) on the same road. Thus, one might construe collective knowledge as 
embodied in physically proximal social interactions. Yet other examples exist that help broaden 
the conception of what kinds of collectives may possess tacit group knowledge.  
Polanyi (1967) provides the example of a scientist who must use certain conventions for 
describing uncertainty in their conclusions to an experiment, even if they themselves “know” the 
results are certain. Such disposition to hedge their claims indicates that the scientist is beholden 
to some criteria knowledge external to their self, such as conventions for statistical significance 
or how to describe correlation results. Some of that knowledge is explicit and collective, such as 
the notion that correlation does not imply causality; other knowledge, for example, knowledge of 
the ways of relating to written language in a given scientific field so as to simultaneously read or 
write professionalism and circumspection are better described as tacit group knowledge.     
The case of tacit collective knowledge of teaching is arguably comparable to that of 
scientists’ knowledge of writing. This tacit knowledge of teaching is collective in the sense that it 
is embodied in the interactions between teacher and students. It is also collective in the sense that 
it is shared between actions teacher and students do and the material resources and constraints 
provided by the artifacts they use in their trade, much in the same way that mechanical and 
electronic apparatuses embody knowledge in technical activity systems (Engeström & Kerosuo, 
2007; Noss, Bakker, Hoyles, & Kent, 2007): Construction tools, calculators and computers, 
textbooks, conventions, notations, and writing formats also have a share in the holding of this 
collective knowledge (see for example Herbst, 2002, for an analysis of the two-column format of 
writing proofs).  While teachers do not typically teach their classes in teams of colleagues, they 
do interact in formal and informal settings (e.g., departmental exchanges among teachers of the 
same course) and use common artifacts such as textbooks or common final exams and these 
interactions contribute to their socialization into this collective tacit knowledge (Horn & Little, 
2010).  
Our interest in tacit group knowledge is presently focused on the instructional norms 
common to teachers of the same course of secondary mathematics studies and the dispositions 
with which teachers handle those norms. As noted above, by norm we mean tacit expectations 
to specific knowledge transactions. Herbst et al. (2011) illustrate this notion of norm in the case 
of introducing a new theorem in geometry: When a proved statement is to be taken by students 
as a theorem that they can use in other pursuits (e.g., to prove other statements), the teacher is 
expected to sanction that statement—they are expected to give it a status by labeling it “theorem” 
or “property.” These norms are often not explicit: Teachers only act as if they followed them. 
Like other tacit social norms they become visible when they are breached. We call dispositions 
the grounds that a group of colleagues might use to justify or else rebuff breaches of norms. Our 
earlier work has demonstrated the existence of norms that are specific to the teaching of specific 
subject matter (e.g., Chazan, et al., 2012; Herbst et al., 2011; Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009). 
Evidence suggests that different norms exist across teaching practices in different cultures 
(Jacobs & Morita, 2002).  
Eliciting Tacit Knowledge of Teaching: Techniques and Tools 
The issue of how to assess teachers’ recognition of instructional norms and how to 
surface their dispositions toward breaches of norms is of critical significance to ground this 
perspective on teaching knowledge. Since tacit knowledge of teaching is inherently tied to action 
in context, examinations of teachers’ tacit knowledge requires either observation of the use of 
this knowledge in actual teaching or some vicarious immersion in action, for example by 
involving practitioners in tasks that include some representations of instruction (Grossman, 
Compton, Igra, Ronfeldt, Shahan, & Williamson, 2009). Representations of instruction have 
commonly been realized using written cases (Freire & Sanches, 1992; Harrington, 1995) and 
video records (Jacobs & Morita, 2002; see also Elliott et al., 2011; Grigorenko, Sternberg, & 
Strauss, 2006; Kagan, 1990; Powell, 2004; Toom, 2006). Therefore, representations of 
instruction provide a useful context for examining teaching norms. In the next section, we 
discuss different forms of representations of teaching and what each may offer in examining tacit 
group knowledge. 
Representations of Teaching Practice 
 Representations of practice can be realized using several media, with artifact and 
photography display, written cases, and video recordings being common in the literature. Herbst, 
Chazan, Chen, Chieu, and Weiss (2011) propose the categories of temporality and individuality 
to describe how various forms of representations of instruction differ. Representations of 
instruction may reproduce the passing of time in the events represented or else they may alter it 
by expanding or collapsing the time that events took. Representations of instruction may also 
mirror the individualities of people and places represented or else they may turn them into 
symbols that only maintain selected aspects of individuality but conceal others.     
 Written vignettes of teaching have been used to examine teachers’ beliefs and knowledge 
concerning practice (e.g., Joram, 2007; Ohan, Visser, Strain, & Allen, 2011; Yoon, Bauman, 
Choi, & Hutchison, 2011). Much of this research focuses on individual interactions with the 
representation(s) of practice, which may be characteristic of how such representations have been 
traditionally used in teacher education; written vignettes have been used to study groups in other 
areas (Hughes & Huby, 2002) as well as in education (Cutter, Palincsar, & Magnusson, 2002; 
Down, Hogan, & Chadbourne, 1999). Various studies have used video representations to engage 
groups of teachers in discussions about practice (Cwikla, 2010; Gonzalez, 2011; Sherin & van 
Es, 2009). Unlike written cases and within the boundaries of the unedited video clip, video 
records of practice can immerse viewers in a temporality similar to that of real classroom events. 
In spite of their limitations (see Hall, 2000), video records can also capture much of the 
individuality of the people and settings involved in those events, unlike written records that 
symbolize those people and settings with word choices. Jacobs and Morita (2002) showed how 
video records could be quite effective in eliciting elements of tacit teaching knowledge (see also 
Colestock & Sherin, 2009; Correa, Perry, Sims, Miller, & Fang, 2008) 
An alternative media for representing teaching are animations of nondescript cartoon 
characters (animations hereafter), which, while lacking the face value of video records, allow 
designers more control on how to depict a scenario (e.g., how much to individuate characters and 
setting). While animations resemble video records in that both of them can approximate the 
temporality of real classroom events, animations do not necessarily display the individualities of 
participants and settings as much as video records do while providing more flexibility than 
written text to do so. Few scholars have used animations to represent instruction (Bailey, 
Tettegah, & Bradley, 2006; Herbst & Chazan, 2006; Moreno & Ortegano-Layne, 2008; Tettegah, 
2005). Moreno and Ortegano-Layne (2008) studied what kind of media form (written case, 
animation, video) is best to support the learning of individual explicit knowledge of prospective 
teachers but no such comparisons have been done for tacit group knowledge of practicing 
teachers.  
How to Elicit Tacit Group Knowledge: What Agenda to Use with the Media 
Tacit group knowledge of instructional norms, such as the sense that colleagues have of 
what is appropriate to provide and expect when assigning a task to students, is hard to bring to 
the surface using direct questions or questionnaires. Accordingly, a question that follows is how 
to use any representation of teaching (written, video, or animation) to elicit the tacit knowledge 
of a group of teachers. There has been research that looks at groups of teachers examining video 
records or other representations of teaching (e.g., Borko et al., 2008; Rosebery & Puttick, 1998; 
Sherin & van Es, 2009). Agendas for such examinations have varied between explicit problem 
posing, where researchers ask direct questions (Makhanya, 2002), to more open ended agendas 
where practitioners are free to pick what they want to talk about (Tochon, 1999). The distinction 
between the two types of agendas seems to be aligned with that between “focus groups” and 
“study groups.” 
Focus groups have been used since the mid 20th century for various forms of social 
research (Flores & Alonso, 1995; Lederman, 1990). Focus groups allow for examination of a 
phenomenon from a shared perspective, where the shared perspective may be elicited through or 
even developed from the interaction among participants who share some common experiences or 
background (Flores & Alonso, 1995; Lederman, 1990). A basic assumption of the focus group 
approach is that participants in a group of individuals that share a common background or 
experiences (e.g., they teach the same course) are more likely to share information more openly 
in a group conversation than they would in a one-on-one context. Flores and Alonso (1995) 
described the use of focus groups in educational research as “a nondirective technique that 
results in the controlled production of a discussion of a group of people” (p. 85). Lederman 
(1990) provides another description of this approach in that while a researcher may use guiding 
questions to help scaffold focus group discussions, the questions are neither exhaustive nor 
overly detailed. Rather, the goal is to provide opportunities for relevant conversations to develop 
in a manner less constrained by an approach that has more specific questioning, and therefore 
less biased by the researcher’s influence. Therefore, the role of the researcher in focus group 
discussions is as facilitator more so than interviewer.  
While focus groups have been used to examine a variety of topics such as school climate 
(McDougall et al., 2007; Saunders & Goldenberg, 2005), female students’ mathematical 
identities (Solomon, Croft, & Lawson, 2010), and teachers’ self-efficacy (Ribeiro & 
DeMagistris, 2009), there are similarities in the manner of their use. In education, focus groups 
have often been used to examine how groups of teachers or students have been affected by some 
intervention or stimulus. But even when focus groups have been used to examine the effect of 
participation in things such as professional development, these uses all appear to concur with 
Flores and Alonso’s (1995) recommendation that such groups have an open agenda where 
interactions among participants may be facilitated but is not directed with explicit research 
questions.  
The approach connected to “study groups” seems to have a subtle but important 
distinction from focus groups in that study groups are purposefully driven towards transforming 
teachers’ beliefs, perceptions, knowledge, or some other facet related to the profession (Clair, 
1998; Saavedra, 1996). While focus groups have been used to assess the effects of professional 
development, study groups have been seen as a form of professional development in and of 
themselves (Arbaugh, 2003; Clair, 1998; Florio-Ruane & Raphael, 2000). On the surface, 
research involving study groups may appear very similar to research involving focus groups. 
Both approaches use open discussion questions to facilitate dialogue (see Sherin & van Es, 2009 
for examples of study group questions). However, the objectives of the two approaches are 
different and they seem to compel facilitators to act differently. For example, Sherin and van Es 
(2009) used video clubs (a form of study group) to help middle school mathematics teachers 
develop their ability to notice and interpret student thinking. While the questions used to scaffold 
the discussion were fairly open at face value, the questions had a purpose in promoting 
participants’ noticing and interpreting of student thinking. 
In our research we were not so much interested in promoting a particular kind of inquiry 
or reflection, but instead we were interested in precipitating the tacit knowledge of the group, 
particularly their knowledge of the norms of instruction. While the literature on focus and study 
groups was important to consider in our developing of agendas, other methodological approaches 
were equally valuable. The ethnomethodological approach in sociology (Garfinkel & Sacks, 
1970; Rafalovich, 2006), in particular, has contributed the technique of breaching experiments to 
precipitate that kind of tacit knowledge: The original breaching experiments consisted of actual 
engagements of usual participants of a social situation in an instance of that situation where one 
of its normative characteristics had been deliberately altered. Participants would denounce a 
breach by engaging in some repair strategies, such as by commenting that something in the 
situation had gone awry. The commentary from participants in which they noticed and elaborated 
on the alterations could then be examined for clues that point to their tacit knowledge of the 
situation. Herbst and Chazan (2003; also Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009) have shown how videotaped 
episodes of instructions that record out of the ordinary instances of an instructional situation can 
be used to engage teachers in a modified, virtual version of a breaching experiment. This 
research had shown how practitioners would also engage in repair strategies when they 
confronted a videorecorded instance of a situation that included a breach of a norm that they did 
not know about beforehand. Since animations can be created deliberately to represent breaches 
of instructional situations that might be hard to find and record in video, and animations might 
enable more systematic study of instructional situations (and conceivably also other social 
situations), it was important to know if animations could elicit similar repairs. But the 
practitioners’ encounters with these animations had to be managed with a similarly open ended 
agenda as that of focus groups.  
In our earlier work with videos we had had focus groups of practicing teachers view 
representations of teaching and discuss what they saw. We’d then inspect their discourse for 
indications of how practitioners appraised the work of the teacher in the video (Nachlieli & 
Herbst, 2009; Weiss et al., 2009). As we looked into doing the same kind of work with groups of 
teachers looking at animations of classroom scenarios, we designed group meetings in such a 
way that their agendas were equally nondirective in terms of what kinds of learning or reflection 
participants were expected to develop. Rather, agendas would pose general topics of 
conversation, for example would submit a particular animation for consideration, but participants 
would choose on their own what to comment on. While other researchers interested in teachers’ 
stances toward events in practice have found it useful to use a more structured agenda (e.g., 
Fenstermacher & Richardson, 1993), our agendas used more open ended tasks for participants 
(e.g., tap the table when they want to say something), and required the facilitator to be responsive 
to the participants’ choice of focus and only manage interpersonal aspects of the discussion (e.g., 
how long someone holds the floor). Research team members sitting at the table with participants 
would ask follow up questions (see Nachlieli, 2011). While these meetings were ‘focus groups’ 
in their design, we called these meetings ‘study groups’ only because that term seemed to 
describe better to participants the nature of the encounters they would be engaged: participants 
came to meetings once a month for a year and in those meetings they discussed in detail 
representations of teaching.  
Thus the agendas used in managing both the animation-based and the video-based 
discussions among teachers were open ended.  This approach seemed to better support the 
contention that encounters with breached representations of teaching could function as virtual 
breaching experiments. The approach of using an open ended agenda appears more adept for 
examining practitioners’ tacit knowledge since the openness of the watching tasks helps develop 
discussions about what the group deems important and how the group feels about it. The present 
inquiry compared the discourse data obtained from groups of teachers in response to video and 
animations when both responses were obtained with an open-ended agenda. 
Using the Linguistic System of Modality to Examine Tacit Group Knowledge 
We sought to compare the discourse of groups of practitioners about a representation of 
teaching in regard to how much they elicited knowledge of instructional norms. To do this, we 
needed to identify statements that contained the communication of a stance toward observed 
classroom events and that appealed to the group for shaping or validating the stance. While all 
videos and animations used represented instructional events where one or more hypothesized 
norms had been breached, we did not limit our search to responses to the breach but looked more 
generally across the sessions at statements in which practitioners referred to observed or 
experienced classroom events. We were, however, interested in statements that indicated a 
negotiated attitude toward instructional events; that is, expressions where participants not only 
offered a stance but also indicated in some way the attempt to relate to others through those 
stances. This was a way for us to operationalize the notion that we were eliciting the tacit 
knowledge the group has of norms of practice. While this operationalization is probably coarse 
in comparison with finer ways of coding discourse for specific purposes (e.g., determining if a 
particular norm has been invoked; as done by Herbst et al., 2011), it had the advantage not only 
that it could provide an approximate solution to the problem of comparing aggregates (responses 
to videos or animations of different events) but also that it could be further operationalized in 
terms of a linguistic indicator that could be used reliably at scale. In Kosko and Herbst (2012) we 
have elaborated at length on how our interest on group knowledge of instructional norms led us 
to look at focus group discourse through the lens of semantic modality as conceived in systemic 
functional linguistics (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). For the analysis described later in this 
paper, we looked at the proportion of modal statements about classroom events in each focus 
group session and compared the averages across the two kinds of sessions (video based and 
animation based). We describe briefly what we mean by modal statements and how those 
satisfied our operational needs below and refer to Kosko & Herbst (2012) for more details of this 
aspect of the method.    
The modality system of language consists of lexical (e.g., auxiliary verbs such as would, 
should, must, or adverbial complements such as always, rarely, etc.) and grammatical (e.g., 
projective clauses such as “I think that…”, “I say …”) resources with which speakers or writers 
may temper propositions or proposals (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Eggins & Slade, 1997).  
Modality is (along with mood and person) one of the systems with which language performs (at 
the lexicogrammatic level of realization) what Halliday calls the interpersonal metafunction: It 
permits speakers and writers to relate to their audience through what they say. Thus modals are 
often used along with propositions and proposals so as to invite the audience to comment on, 
concur with, or contradict those propositions or proposals. In particular, modals do that by 
allowing a degree of uncertainty in what is asserted or proposed.  
Halliday’s account of systemic functional linguistics classifies modality resources into 
four categories: inclination (desirability), obligation (appropriateness), probability, and usuality.2 
Of these, desirability (e.g., “I’d like the teacher to write that on the board”) and obligation (e.g., 
“He should have written that on the board”) offer lexicogrammatic choices to modulate 
proposals or provide means to temper statements of what ought to be the case. In contrast 
probability (e.g., “The students are not likely to remember what he said”) and usuality (e.g., “I 
always write what I want them to do” offer lexicogrammatic choices to modalize propositions or 
                                                
2 Lemke (1998) renames these and adds comprehensibility, humorousness, and importance. Eggins & Slade (1997) 
add capacity. For our purposes we used Halliday’s four categories. 
provide means to temper statements of what is the case (see Eggins & Slade, 1997, pp. 98-106). 
While each of those modality types tempers what the clause asserts in a different way, all four of 
those modality types provide resources for speakers to appeal to the audience to negotiate a 
stance, as opposed to merely stating a stance. In particular, participants could use those resources 
to negotiate a stance toward a classroom event and in particular to engage the group in 
denouncing a breach of an instructional norm.3 All of those modality types appear to be 
substantively connected to different interpretations of the notion of a norm with appropriateness 
being more committal than desirability as a way to assert a norm in the sense of what participants 
hold each other accountable to do, and probability and usuality being different ways of 
tempering a statement of the norm in the sense of what frequently happens.  We relied on 
participants’ uses of modality in clauses that versed on instructional events to create a 
quantitative indicator of the extent to which the discussions in a focus group session featured 
group knowledge of instructional norms (Kosko & Herbst, 2012).    
Semantic modality, as a resource for the realization of the interpersonal metafunction of 
language, is concerned with “enacting our personal and social relationships” (Halliday & 
Matthiessen, 2004, p. 29) through language. Clearly, participants in a group talking about 
instructional practice could make polar statements, statements that affirm or deny something 
without qualification  (e.g., “He did not write the problem on the board”). In making a modal 
statement (e.g., “He could have written the problem on the board”), however, the statement not 
only makes an observation about the world but also invites others to respond to it.  Since the 
                                                
3 It is clear that other linguistic resources could also appeal to the audience: For example, the mood of a clause may 
also do that, such as when a speaker chooses to ask a question (e.g., “is that right?”) as opposed to merely state an 
assertion (e.g., “that’s not right”). Also, the person of a clause, or the speaker’s choice of how to denote who is 
making the claim, is an interpersonal resource: When someone says “we don’t do that” instead of “I don’t do that,” 
this indicates an effort to involve the audience in the claim. We expect that later efforts to size up the extent to which 
statements made by a member of a group appeal to the group would find ways to include resources from different 
linguistic systems. Here we’ve only looked at modality.      
object of the talk, events in instructional practice, belong to the participants of the group 
conversation, such modal statements can be considered representations of group knowledge. 
Since the discussion had an open agenda and was facilitated without explicit questions about the 
norms of instruction, participants’ modal statements about instructional practice could be viewed 
as embodying evidence of tacit knowledge.  
We asked the following research questions: 
• Is there a difference in the proportion of modal statements about mathematics teaching 
between sessions where teachers watched a video representation of mathematics teaching 
and sessions where teachers watched an animated representation of mathematics 
teaching? 
• Are there differences in the type of modality in statements about mathematics teaching 
between sessions where teachers watched a video representation of mathematics teaching 
and sessions where teachers watched an animated representation of mathematics 
teaching? 
 
Methods 
Sample 
We conducted a secondary analysis of group conversations among teachers of high 
school geometry. Conversations had been video-recorded and then transcribed, with the 
transcripts of the audio track serving as the main source of data for analysis. We examined 
transcripts from 10 group sessions, half were from sessions where teachers had viewed and 
responded to a video representation of teaching and half were from sessions where teachers had 
viewed and responded to animated representations. All of those sessions had been managed with 
an open-ended agenda as described above. Sessions averaged 7 teachers per meeting in both 
video and animation sessions with the number of participants per session ranging between 4 and 
15. Participants came from a range of districts including rural, urban, and suburban; all of them 
had, as a rule, three or more years of experience teaching high school geometry (see Table 1). On 
average, teachers had 15 years of experience in the classroom (range = 3 to 36), 11 of which 
were specific to the teaching of High School Geometry (range = 2 to 36). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. 
 
Participants* per Session and Session Type. 
 
Video-based Session Animation-based Session 
Date of Session N Date of Session N 
May 5, 2002 4 December 6, 2005 4 
November 22, 2002 4 March 7, 2006 4 
May 17, 2003 6 August 22, 2006 15 
August 17, 2004-1 7 January 16, 2007 9 
August 17, 2004-2 7 January 24, 2007 8 
Total  N 28  
 
40 
 
* As a rule groups included different participants though some individuals participated 
in more than one session.  
 
In both sessions where video and animations were viewed, participating teachers would 
watch a representation of classroom teaching, either video or animation, and engage in 
discussion about the teaching depicted. The teaching depicted in each of those included practices 
that were not normative (e.g., in the video the teacher was seen encouraging a student to assume 
a statement without immediately providing a justification, in the context of doing a proof), 
though other practices were normative (e.g., the teacher posed the problem and let students’ 
work on the problem). The video-based sessions were ones that had been successful in eliciting 
responses from participants that informed about the norms of practice (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; 
Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Weiss et al., 2009). The present study compared transcribed audio data 
from those video-based sessions with data generated by confronting similar groups of teachers 
with animations that, likewise, depicted scenarios with at least one breach of a norm of the 
situation “doing proofs” in high school geometry (Herbst, Chen, Weiss, and González, 2009). 
Table 2 describes the video and animations used in each session.  
Table 2. Artifacts used in each Session and Session Type. 
Session Artifact Title Synopsis and Breach 
All Video-
based 
Sessions 
Angle 
Bisectors of a 
Parallelogram 
A teacher is managing the students’ work on proving that the 
angle bisectors of a parallelogram make a rectangle. The 
student at the board makes a statement but cannot justify it and 
the teacher encourages the student to assume the statement is 
true and move on with the proof; the teacher points out that 
they will come back to justify the assumed statement later. 
Animation-
based session 
12/6/05 
The 
Parallelogram 
The class is investigating the angle bisectors of a 
parallelogram. Students assume the diagonals are angle 
bisectors and take that as givens for the proof that angle 
bisectors meet at a point. The teacher lets students continue on 
with that assumption. 
Animation-
based sessions 
12/6/05 and 
03/7/06 
The Kite The class is investigating what happens with the angle 
bisectors of a kite. One student assumes that the diagonals are 
angle bisectors and starts out a proof. The teacher lets the 
student continue on with the proof until she reaches an 
impasse. Later on the teacher asks students to consider two 
possible diagrams while doing the proof: in one the angle 
bisectors meet at one point and in the other they make three 
points of intersection. 
Animation-
based sessions 
8/22/06, 
1/16/07, and 
1/24/07 
A Proof about 
Rectangles 
The teacher is manages the work on a proof about a rectangle. 
Rather than stating the givens and the “prove” statement, the 
teacher engages the class in proposing givens. Later on the 
teacher allows students to skip steps and omit reasons. 
 The agendas for both kinds of group sessions were open-ended and, in particular, 
participants were not told whether the representation (either video or animation) was proposed as 
a good or bad example, or that it contained a breach of a norm: Participants were told that the 
representation was a case of doing proofs in high school geometry instruction. They were invited 
to comment freely, all comments were accepted and not evaluated. Quite often participants 
would engage with each other’s comments and the conversation would continue without the need 
for facilitation. 
Preparation of Data for Analysis 
 To compare teacher group responses in video and animated sessions, we used Systemic 
Functional Linguistics (SFL; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) to examine the transcribed data 
from each session. Specifically, we examined teachers’ use of modality, which, as described 
above, is a language resource that enables speakers to fulfill what Halliday has called the 
interpersonal metafunction of language: to relate to others. Modality allows a speaker to invite 
others into the conversation by hedging the utterances they make, such that the speaker’s uttered 
claims are not limited to what is or what isn’t, but what may be, can be, must be, etc. By hedging 
one’s claim with modality, the speaker expands the meaning-making potential that can follow 
from the uttered claim (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). For example, in a video session from our 
data, one participating teacher noted that, “there are a bunch of skills that go into the proof which 
we don’t really make visible to the students.” By applying the modal really to the second half of 
her utterance, the participant invited other participants in the session to shape the claim made 
(arguably their choice of person—we—also supports that invitation). However, if the participant 
had simply stated that, “I don’t make  [those skills] visible to the students,” the statement would 
have invited fewer potential responses. Modality supports speakers’ establishment of 
relationships with others because by qualifying the process it reports, a modal clause opens the 
floor for other voices, inviting to concur or lessening the cost of disagreeing (Martin & White, 
2007). So “we don’t really make [the skills] visible” effectively invites more responses from 
others than “I don’t make [the skills] visible” because the latter statement is stated as if it were 
fact, and thus conveys a sterner stance in which another speaker is less likely to counter. 
Table 3 
Modality classifications. 
Probability 
High 
(+) Alpha has definitely changed the problem. 
(–) Alpha has certainly not worked on the problem posed. 
Median 
(+) Alpha probably knows what he is talking about. 
(–) Alpha may not know what angle bisectors are. 
Low 
(+) Alpha might need a reminder of what the problem was. 
(–) Alpha might not be so far off a solution. 
Usuality 
High  Alpha always makes confusing claims. 
Median  Alpha usually wants to share his work. 
Low  Alpha rarely has anything worth spending time on. 
Zero  Alpha never justifies his claims. 
Appropriateness 
High 
(+) It was required that Alpha marked the diagram. 
(–) Alpha must not answer before being called. 
Median 
(+) Alpha should have marked the diagram. 
(–) Alpha was not supposed to answer before being called. 
Low 
(+) Alpha may mark the diagram. 
(–) It’s unnecessary for Alpha mark the diagram. 
Inclination 
High 
(+) I like the teacher to encourage Alpha. 
(–) I don’t like it when students go back to their seats discouraged. 
Median 
(+) I’d be inclined to draw the diagram myself. 
(–) I’d not like to derail Alpha’s train of thought.  
Low 
(+) I’d be okay doing that. 
(–) I’m not sure that is the best thing to do. 
 
As noted above Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) identify four categories of modality: 
probability, usuality, obligation (which we refer to as appropriateness), and inclination. 
Probability conveys the degree to which the speaker reports the likelihood of a process, while 
usuality conveys how typical a process is reported to be. Appropriateness refers to the degree to 
which a process is regarded as appropriate, while inclination expresses the speaker’s 
consideration of a process as desirable. Each modality type can be conveyed as positive or 
negative and each category can be expressed with varying degrees of intensity. Examples for 
each category are provided in Table 3. 
 While use of modality in discourse invites responses from other participants, the specific 
categories of modality allow for a level of interpretability in regards to the grounds on which a 
hedge has been made. So, using a token of appropriateness offers a proposal as appropriate, or 
not. By doing so, such a proposal also prompts other participants to contribute their own 
appraisal. For example, during one animation session, a participant commented that the teacher 
“…should have just said, ‘let’s try to prove it all,’ and he didn’t” which another participant 
responded “Or maybe depending on how much experience they have with proofs, break them up 
into groups at that point…” The first participant used modality to describe the appropriateness of 
the animated teacher’s actions, suggesting something that should have happened, which the 
second participant responded with another possibility. Note that the second participant’s 
statement responded not only to the use of modality, but to the type of modality that was used; in 
noting what should have happened, a response to another possible action that could happen. Of 
particular interest for us is the fact that both hedged statements tell us something about the 
participants’ knowledge of instructional practice. This feature of modality is what we view as 
being useful in examining teachers’ tacit knowledge. 
To examine the transcribed data, we used WordSmith 5.0 (Oxford University Press, 2004), a text 
analysis application, which could create concordances for a number of words that are often used 
as modals (e.g., would, likely, see Table 3 for examples and the Appendix for the complete list). 
The concordances were used to identify clauses that had those target words. Then, the clauses 
were examined to determine whether the target word had been used as a modal (or instead was a 
false positive). Further, clauses that contained modals were also examined in regard to whether 
the process reported in the clause concerned the practice of teaching (as opposed to logistics of 
the session; e.g., food would be good now; these modals were excluded from analysis). 
Additionally, once a word was identified as a modal, it was then categorized, assigned a negative 
or positive degree, and assigned a rank of intensity (see Table 3 and the Appendix).  
Two raters examined the concordances and the transcribed data for these features. 
Cohen’s Kappa was used as a measure of the interrater reliability. The Kappa scores can be 
interpreted such that < 0 is poor; .01 - .20 is slight, .21 - .40 is fair; .41 - .60 is moderate; .61 - .80 
is substantial; and .81 – 1 is almost perfect (Sim & Wright, 2005). A Kappa of .88 was obtained 
for rater agreement in whether or not a word in the concordance was used as a modal or not. 
Kappa statistics for assignment to the modality classification and degree of that classification 
were as follows: .79 for probability; .94 for usuality; .88 for appropriateness; and .84 for 
inclination. Therefore, the coding process was deemed to have sufficient reliability. Raters then 
reconciled the data before it was used in analysis. 
In addition to using the concordance to detect words that might have been used to make a 
modal statement, we also examined the discourse for teachers’ use of mental and verbal 
transitive processes (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004). Mental processes are typically denoted with 
verbs such as think, feel, like, see, hear, believe, etc., while verbal processes are typically 
denoted with verbs such as say, tell, etc. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) indicate that mental 
and verbal processes can be used as grammatical metaphors for modality. For example, the 
participant statement “I think a lot of kids struggle in geometry because they have trouble 
bringing that language to a drawing” is a modal version of “A lot of kids struggle in geometry 
because they have trouble bringing that language to a drawing.” The former statement conveys a 
sense of openness similar to the examples of modality presented thus far, while the latter is a 
polar statement. Given this relationship, we included mental and verbal processes in our analysis 
as a separate classification. Thus mental and verbal processes were counted as being present as 
grammatical metaphors of modality and then coded as indicating negative or positive stances. 
Similar to the coding process for modality, two raters coded for mental and verbal processes. A 
Kappa of .94 was obtained for rater agreement in whether or not a word in the concordance was 
a mental or verbal transitive process with specific Kappa scores of .84 for mental processes and 
.81 for verbal processes. Therefore, the coding process was deemed to have sufficient interrater 
reliability; codes were reconciled where differences between the two coders occurred (see Kosko 
and Herbst, 2012). 
Analysis and Results 
 Our first research question sought to examine whether the frequencies of hedged 
statements, either with modals or mental/verbal processes, about mathematics teaching differed 
between video and animation sessions. To examine this research question, we calculated the 
percentage of spoken words by teachers in each session that had been deemed indicators of 
modality, either because they were modal words or because they were mental/verbal processes 
used in the service of modality. This was done since some sessions lasted longer than others, and 
thus could have contained more modals or mental/verbal processes just by virtue of the length of 
conversation. Once percentages were calculated, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was used for 
three analyses between each condition: to see if there was a difference in the use of modality 
(including both modal words and mental/verbal processes), to see if there was a difference in 
modal words alone, and to see if there was a difference in the use of mental/verbal processes. 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney was a particularly appropriate test given the low sample size in 
the comparison (n = 10 sessions). Further, Siegel and Castellan (1988) have characterized it as 
“one of the most powerful of the nonparametric tests” and “a very useful alternative to the 
parametric t test” (pp. 128-129).  
Given the varying lengths of the different sessions, we weighted the frequency counts of 
modals and grammatical metaphors for modality (mental and verbal processes) by dividing the 
counts by the number of words in a particular session. This allowed for a weighted comparison 
when applying the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
found no statistically significant differences between video and animation sessions in regards to 
frequency of modality usage overall (U = 17.0, p = .421) or modals (U = 17.5, p = .310). These 
results indicate that both video and animation sessions had relatively similar proportions of 
modal usage. However, a significant difference was found in the proportion of mental/verbal 
processes used (U = 22.5, p < .05), indicating that sessions where animations were viewed had 
higher proportions of mental/verbal processes used in the discussions surrounding them than in 
sessions where videos were viewed. 
Our second research question focuses on differences between video sessions and 
animation sessions for particular classifications of modality and processes. Given the categorical 
nature of such data, chi-square statistics were calculated for each comparison. The first 
comparison sought to examine whether a relationship existed between the type of grammatical 
metaphor elicited (whether a mental process or a verbal process was used as grammatical 
metaphor of modality) and the type of media used in sessions (video or animation).  A Chi-
square statistic of 13.26 (p < .001) was found, indicating that the relationship between type of 
grammatical metaphor used (mental or verbal process) was not independent from the type of 
session (video or animation). Table 4 illustrates that 71.1% of grammatical metaphors were 
mental processes in video sessions compared to only 65.9% in animation sessions. However, 
verbal processes made up a higher percentage of the grammatical metaphors used in animation 
sessions (34.1%) as compared to video sessions (29.9%). Such differences do not, on the surface, 
seem meaningfully large, since both forms of representation elicited mental processes in higher 
frequencies than verbal processes. However, the statistical significance suggests a more nuanced 
relationship. When the results of the Chi-square analyses are paired with the results from the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, they indicate that while animation sessions had higher 
proportions of grammatical metaphors (both mental and verbal processes) than video sessions, 
when we separate these counts into mental or verbal processes, video sessions had comparatively 
higher frequencies in mental processes than animation sessions, and animated sessions had 
comparatively higher frequencies in verbal processes. In other words, teachers made more 
statements involving both mental and verbal processes during animation sessions than in video 
sessions, but the proportion of type of process elicited was different depending on the type of 
representation used. 
Table 4. Presence of Mental or Verbal Process. 
 
  Video Session Animation Session Total 
 
Verbal Process 
477 1056 1533 
Mental Process 1172 2039 3211 
Total 1649 3095 4744 
 
 Comparisons within the modality classifications for differences between video and 
animation sessions are displayed in Table 5. Several statistically significant relationships were 
found for: probability (!! = 4.15, p < .05), appropriateness (!! = 7.17, p < .01), and inclination 
(!! = 5.99, p < .05). These results indicate that the relationships between these particular types 
of modality (probability, appropriateness, inclination) are not independent from the 
representation used in the discussion sessions (video versus animation). Examination of Table 3 
shows that animation sessions had proportionally higher frequencies for appropriateness and 
probability than video sessions, while video sessions had proportionally higher frequencies for 
inclination than animation sessions. No statistically significant difference was found for the 
usage of the usuality type of modality (!! = 1.47, p = .226). 
Table 5. 
 
Presence of Modality Classifications. 
 
  Video Session Animation Session Total 
Probability No 518 747 1265 
Yes 464 792 1256 
Total 982 1539 2521 
Usuality No 879 1400 2279 
Yes 103 139 242 
Total 982 1539 2521 
Appropriateness No 624 895 1519 
Yes 358 644 1002 
Total 982 1539 2521 
Inclination No 703 1169 1872 
Yes 279 370 649 
Total 982 1539 2521 
 
While one session type was more likely to elicit one form of modality over another 
session type (e.g., animation sessions had higher proportions of appropriateness modals than 
video sessions), it is worth noting that both animated and video sessions elicited more probability 
modals than appropriateness, more appropriateness modals than inclination, and more inclination 
modals than usuality. This similarity in the rank of modal-usage type, combined with the results 
of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, suggests that while video and animation sessions elicit 
similar kinds of modal-usage in teachers’ discussions about mathematics teaching, there are 
subtle differences in such modal-usage. Implications of these findings are provided in the 
discussion section of this article. 
Table 6. Sample Statements from Video and Animation Sessions. 
 Video Sessions Animation Sessions 
Probability “I would probably stop at this point, and 
if the students were having problems, 
then I would do an example…” 
“It might have been easier to 
understand if it was a proof by 
contradiction…” 
Usuality “My students, they always used to do 
this…” 
“I’ve always done paragraph proofs 
when doing proof by 
contradiction.” 
Appropriate
ness 
“They should have used numbers in all 
those angles, because there’s too many 
angles there…” 
“I mean you could put the given at 
the beginning of the proof…” 
Inclination I think it might be good to see how far 
they can get without that…” 
“I don’t want every [one of] my 
kids to, just to take it as a given and 
go on even if you have no idea…” 
Mental 
Process 
“I mean, I think that I would assign the 
same problem as homework …” 
“I mean, visually you can slide the 
two diagrams together and they 
appear congruent.” 
Verbal 
Process 
“That wouldn’t work in my classroom, I 
guess is what I’m saying.” 
“Using givens, let’s say that you 
already know that the rectangle 
formula exists.” 
  
The results of the present study should be taken as evidence of differences in the relative 
frequencies of modality usage. The types of statements in video and animation sessions were 
generally similar in nature. Table 6 provides a useful sample of statements from each modality 
type and grammatical metaphor examined. Notably, sample statements from the video and 
animation sessions describe the work associated with mathematics teaching in similar ways. So, 
while the types of statements that incorporate probability modals are similar in nature, regardless 
of the type of representation used, animation sessions elicited proportionally more of such types 
of statements than video sessions. 
Discussion 
A consequence of this study is that animations appear to be just as useful as videos to 
elicit modal statements about instructional practice. As long as that is the purpose of the 
research, producing animations to elicit that data seems not to threaten the work of researchers 
with loss of information, at least as far as its quantity. The study also suggests that there are 
subtle differences in the kinds of modal-usage elicited.  
• It suggests that animations may tap into appropriateness more so than videos, while video 
does so for inclination. This is an interesting distinction since both appropriateness and 
inclination are described as resources for the modulation of proposals by Halliday & 
Matthiessen (2004; see also Eggins & Slade, 1997, p. 102). Proposals are statements that 
suggest what ought to happen: Modals temper proposals in different ways, indicating that 
something can, should, or must be done, and also that one is willing to, keen to, or 
determined to do it. The appropriateness type of modality seems to assume more of a 
collective stance than the inclination type. Given that animations elicited higher usage of 
appropriateness modals than videos, it appears that an animation-based conversation 
might more clearly relay norms of instruction.  
• Suggests that animations may tap into probability more so than videos. While not 
statistically significant, video sessions had higher proportion of usuality propositions than 
animations. This may suggest a similar distinction in propositions (assertions of what is 
and what is not) as was found for proposals.  
• The apparent preference to respond to videos with desirability proposals as opposed to 
appropriateness proposals could be related to teachers’ reticence to be critical of 
colleagues when watching video. Seago (2004, p. 275) notes that when teachers discuss 
video records “politeness and agreement is the norm” and that teachers tend to handle 
differences with comments such as ‘everybody needs to teach according to his style.’ (see 
also Levine, 1984) 
The study helps validate a novel kind of instrumentation for research on teacher thinking, by 
demonstrating that when animations are used along with open-ended agendas, they produce 
similar responses from groups of teachers as comparable video episodes do. Since animations 
can be produced so as to systematically represent breaches of instructional situations and they 
can be just as useful in the study of the tacit knowledge of groups of teachers as videos can, it 
seems that education researchers interested in tapping this phenomenon could do so by 
producing animations and using them to prompt conversations among practitioners. 
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Appendix 
 
Desirability / Inclination 
3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 
High: 
Conviction 
Belief? 
Median: 
Attitude 
Low: 
Undertaking 
(-) Low: 
~Undertaking 
(-) Median: 
~Attitude 
(-) High: 
~Conviction 
Determined 
Conviction 
*Definitely 
*Certainly 
 
Keen to 
Pleasure to 
Wonderful to 
Great to 
Excellent to 
Good to 
*Miraculously 
Fortunate to 
*Amazingly 
 
Willing to 
(it’s a ) commitment 
“I” Would 
I’d 
Considering 
 
 “I” Would not 
Lack conviction 
to 
Not determined to 
Not convinced 
that/… 
 
Horrible 
Distasteful 
Alarming* 
Bad 
 
Determined not to 
Convinced that itsn’t 
Unwilling 
 
*denotes cross-classification with other modal type. 
 
Obligation / Appropriateness  
3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 
High: 
Directive 
Median: 
Advice 
Low: 
Permission 
(-) Low: 
~Permission 
(-) Median: 
~Advice 
(-) High: 
~Directive 
Necessary to 
Needed (need to) 
Responsibly 
Must 
Required to 
Have to 
Has to 
 
Appropriate to 
Appropriately 
Valid to 
Should 
Ought to 
Supposed to 
Acceptable to 
Acceptably 
*May (permissive) 
Allowed to 
Permitted to 
*can (permissive) 
 
*May not (permissive) 
Not Allowed to 
Unnecessary to 
 
Inappropriate to 
Invalid to 
Shouldn’t 
Will not 
Ought not 
Not supposed to 
Not Acceptable to 
not needed to 
Irresponsible 
Mustn’t 
Not Required to 
Not have to 
*Cannot 
(permissive) 
*denotes possible cross-classification with other modal type. 
 
 
 
Warrantability / Probability (Comprehensibility / Obviousness)   
3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 
High: 
Certain 
Median: 
Probable 
Low: 
Possible 
(-) Low: 
Uncertain 
(-) Median: 
Improbable 
(-) High: 
Impossible 
Will/Shall 
*Certain(ly) 
*Definitely 
Sure(ly) 
Absolute(ly) 
Really 
Literally 
Simply 
Inevitab(ly) 
Of course 
No doubt 
Indeed 
Undeniably 
Unquestionably 
Obviously\\ 
Of course\\ 
Clearly\\ 
Plainly\\ 
 (I) think 
*May 
Likely 
Probab(ly) 
“to some extent” 
Mostly 
Evidently\\ 
Apparently\\ 
Presumably\\ 
Seemingly\\ 
Admitably 
Arguably 
Might 
*Can 
(I) suspect 
Possibl(ly) 
Roughly 
So to speak 
Plausible 
Capable** 
Able to/ability to** 
Mysterious\\ 
Vaguely\\ 
Kind of** 
Sort of** 
Kinda** 
Sorta** 
Not really 
Evitable 
Doubtful 
Questionably 
Might not 
Not certain 
Illogical\\ 
*May not 
Unlikely 
Improbable 
unapparent 
Hardly\\ 
 
*Can not 
Incomprehensible\\ 
Impossib(ly) 
Implausible 
Incapable** 
Unable/not able** 
Certainly not 
 
\\ denotes “Comprehensibility/Obviousness”; **denotes “Capability-Ability; *denotes cross-classification with other modal type. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Usuality / Expectability  
4 3 2 1 
High  
Always /Almost Always 
Median:  
Usual 
Low:  
Rare 
(-) Zero  
Never 
Always 
Typical 
Mainly 
 
Usually 
Usual 
Expectable 
In most cases 
Mostly 
Largely 
Often 
Almost Always 
 
 
Sometimes 
Rare/Rarely 
Atypical 
Unusual 
Surprising(ly) 
*Alarming 
*Miraculous 
*Amazingly 
Seldom 
Almost 
Almost Never 
Not Often 
Never 
*denotes cross-classification with other modal type. 
 
